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Cordova is a town of approximately 2,000 people 
located on the southern coast of Alaska. A power grid 
for a town this size, with a large seasonal fishing 
economy, is considered a moderate to large sized 
microgrid in terms of power produced. Understanding 
the vulnerabilities and risks of failures in such a grid is 
important for planning and operations.  Investigating 
these characteristics in the context of complex system 
dynamics is a novel approach. The analysis of 
Cordova’s microgrid is a case study relevant to a large 
class of microgrid communities. We analyze the outage 
data based on size, cause characteristics, and load 
demand on the system and find long time correlations 
and power laws in the failure size distributions. Finally 
we apply a risk metric to give a single numerical value 
to the risk of an outage occurring during certain time 
periods and under certain conditions.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
In order to create a more reliable power grid, it is 
important to examine the outage causes and patterns that 
exist on the current grid. This has been done in depth on 
large power grids [1]-[17], but less so in microgrids. A 
system that can be used to analyze microgrids is the 
Cordova grid. Cordova has an average load of about 2 
MW in winter and up to 8 MW during summer fish 
processing season. Cordova is electrically islanded from 
the state and national grids and is powered by about 70% 
hydroelectric and 30% diesel generation. The diesel 
generation occurs at the Orca Power Plant, and there are 
two hydro generation plants, Power Creek and 
Humpback Creek. All of these connect to the Eyak 
Substation, from which five main feeders send power to 
the town and the fish processing facilities. To do this 
sort of analysis for the town of Cordova, data on all 
outages, average hourly load demand and generation for 
the town was provided to us by the Cordova Electric 
Cooperative. The data provided covers outages for a 
span of 15 years (from 2003-2017) and the hourly load 
demand for a span of 13 years (from 2005-2017). We 
analyze the outage data by itself first to look at the 
characteristics of the system and then we correlate this 
outage data with a variety of external factors that may 
influence outages, such as severe weather events or 
fluctuating customer demand. In the end, we use these 
analyses in order to create a risk metric for the system, 
similar to what was done in [17]-[18]. 
We start in the first analysis sub-section using the 
outage size information to analyze characteristics and 
behaviors of the microgrid in this town, namely 
investigating the system from the complex system 
dynamics point of view. Many of the larger grids 
analyzed prior to this have shown power laws when 
looking at the distribution of the outage sizes [1]-[17] 
and long time correlations between failures. The fact 
that these power laws and long time correlations exist in 
the Cordova data can tell us things about the underlying 
dynamical evolution of the system. When these 
characteristics exist, it is suggestive that the grid may be 
behaving as a complex system. In power systems, the 
complex systems dynamics often come from an 
interplay between the engineered part of the system (the 
generation and distribution) and the human components 
which include the operations, regulation, and demand. 
Regardless of the dynamics, a shallower slope in the 
power law means that the large events are occurring 
more frequently than we would expect and thus will play 
a more dominant role in the blackout risk. While certain 
topologies can lead to power law PDFs (Probability 
Distribution Function) in outage size the long time 
correlations are more difficult to explain without the 
system dynamics.    







After investigating the characteristics of the 
microgrid’s overall outage data by itself, we look deeper 
into the causes of the outages. We look at individual 
causes of these outages in order to see if there is a 
particular cause or type of cause that is leading to a 
disproportionate number of outages. We then break 
down the outages further and look at the size distribution 
of outages from some of the major causes to see if there 
is a cause that is associated with more large or small 
outages compared to normal. 
Because the Cordova grid is for a single town, we 
can obtain weather history for this town and compare 
weather events to the outages. These weather events 
include blizzards, floods, and high wind storms. We also 
look at daily weather data such as precipitation, 
snowfall, and average temperature and correlate these 
events with the outages to look for any trends or 
periodicities. 
Finally, we compare the outages with the hourly load 
demand. We see both daily and annual fluctuations in 
the load and analyze how this affects outages. We look 
deeper into outage size to determine if there are certain 
times in the load demand cycles that cause more large 
or small outages than average. 
 
 
2. The Cordova Data  
 
The first Cordova data we looked at was a summary 
of the outages that occurred within the power grid from 
the years 2003-2017. This information included the time 
of each outage, the duration, the specific feeder it 
occurred on, how many customer meters were affected 
by the outage, and the cause of the outage (if known). 
Except for when we are specifically analyzing the 
different feeders, it is assumed that outages that occur at 
the same time, for the same duration, and with the same 
cause, but on different feeders, are the same outage and 
are combined into one in the analysis.  It is worth noting 
that we can analyze the planned outages and unplanned 
outages separately which can be important for 
understanding the risk. 
As with most distribution grids, the Cordova grid has 
a mainly tree-like topology rather than the more mesh-
like topology characteristic of transmission grids. 
Because of this, cascading failures are less likely. 
Consistent with this, in the outage data we noticed a few 
outages that appeared to be cascading failures. We 
counted the failure as cascading if a second (or more) 
failure occurred on another feeder before the first was 
fixed and if the cause of the outage was unplanned. 
There were a total of 18 cascading failures from 
unplanned outages out of a total of 522 unplanned 
outages for the 15 years. This means 3.4% of the 
unplanned outages appear to be cascading. A majority 
of the cascading failures were attributed to the causes 
“Power Supplier – Hydro” and “Distribution – Primary 
Cable.” 
While looking at the outage data, we correlated the 
outages with historical weather data in Cordova. This 
weather history included daily precipitation values, 
daily snowfall, daily current snow depth, floods, 
blizzards, and high wind events [21]-[22]. We looked at 
any correlations between these stronger weather events 
and when outages occurred. 
Following this, the load demand of the system was 
analyzed. We were given hourly load demand for each 
feeder for the years 2005-2017. This data consisted of 
an average of every second of the load demand over that 
hour in order to get a value for the specific hour. We 
were also given second by second data on the power 
generated in the system, divided into hydro power and 
diesel power, which can simply be combined to give 
total power generated. This second by second data was 
course grained into hourly data both to match that given 




3. Analysis  
 
3.1 Time series 
First, the outages are analyzed in terms of size. There 
are four different measures for size: the duration of the 
outage in minutes, the number of customer meters (a 
proxy for customers which will be referred to as 
“customers”) affected by the outage, the duration 
multiplied by the number of customers affected, and an 
estimate of the amount of energy that was unserved due 
to an outage. An example time series for the third 
measure is shown below in figure 1. Unless there is 
something of interest in the first two measures that 
differs greatly from the third, most of the analysis looks 
at the third measure – duration times customers affected 
– and the fourth measure - amount of average power 
unserved during the outage times the duration of the 
outage. These measures give a more complete picture of 
the size and impact of the outages.  
Figure 1 shows a plot of outages as measured by 
customers times duration. The outages vary greatly in 
size, and the larger outages seem to be distributed over 
the time series. Looking at duration alone does not give 
full information on the magnitude of the outages in 
terms of how many customers are affected. A shorter 
duration outage that takes out hundreds of customers 
may have a larger impact than a longer duration outage 
that only affects a few customers. For example, the 
largest outage in terms of duration occurs in early 2005. 




event does not have a large impact because it only 
affected one customer. 
 
 
Figure 1. Time Series of Outages Measured 
by Number of Customers unserved x Duration 
in Minutes 
 
The outages measured by the number of customers 
affected show certain distinct levels because different 
feeders get maxed out at specific values. These distinct 
levels seen are the total number of customers on each 
feeder, which gives a maximum value to how many 
customers can be affected by an outage on a particular 
feeder. The numbers of customers, again as defined by 
meters, on each feeder are: Auxiliary – 104, 13 Mile – 
226, Main Town – 317, Lake Avenue – 430, New Town 
– 517. 
The duration of the outages and the number of 
customers down in each outage are straightforward 
measures and come directly from the outage data. The 
energy unserved measure comes from the outage data in 
combination with the load demand data. To get the 
estimate of the size of an outage in terms of energy 
unserved, we used the information from the load 
demand at a given time on the feeder that the outage 
occurred. Since there is no individual customer data, we 
assumed (though this is clearly wrong) that all of the 
customers on a particular feeder used an equal amount 
of the total load on that feeder. The energy not served 
was calculated by: 
 
Energy Unserved=customers×load×duration     (1) 
with 
customers = number of meters out on a feeder  
load = load per meter on that feeder  
duration = duration of the outage in minutes 
 
Since the load demand value sometimes goes down 
while there is an outage we used the load value from the 
hour before the outage began plus the load value from 
the hour after the outage ended and divided by 2. Since 
this is feeder-dependent the energy unserved was 
calculated for each outage first and then the outages that 
occurred at the same time and for the same duration 
were combined. In Figure 2 the time series for outages 
on the Lake Ave, New Town, Main Town, 13 Mile, and 
Auxiliary feeders in terms of energy unserved are 
shown. 
 
Figure 2. Time Series of Outages Measured 
by Energy Unserved 
 
Even with the multiple assumptions made to 
calculate the estimate of the energy unserved, we still 
believe this is the best measure for the size of an outage. 
This measure takes into account the duration of the 
outage, an estimate of how many customers the outage 
affected, and amount of power that is usually being 
consumed that is lost. This causes two outages that may 
have a similar duration and number of customers 
unserved to be sized differently depending on when 
during a load demand cycle they occur. This also means 
an outage during a peak demand time will hold more 
weight and be considered a larger outage. This 
discrepancy between two similar outages is beneficial 
because an outage that occurs during peak demand time 
will have the largest negative impact on customers. 
When looking at the distribution of the differently 
sized outages on the (energy unserved) and (customers 
times duration time series), we observe there is a wide 
variety of outage sizes, with small outages (and no 
outage) being by far the most common. While small 
outages are more common, we do see large outages 
occurring every one to two years and intermediate 
outages occurring at a rate somewhere in between the 
rate of small and large outages. This indicates that our 
system is showing size effects characteristic of complex 
systems. Because of this, we look deeper into the 
analyses done on complex systems, in particular, 
looking for power law behavior in a probability 
distribution function (PDF) of the outages. 
 
3.2 PDFs and long time correlations in the 
Time Series 
 
Using the four different measures of outage size we 
construct size histograms of the outages and plot the 
probability distribution function (PDF) to determine the 
probability of having an outage of a particular size. In 




these outages are sorted and grouped by size and then 
graphed on a log-log plot. To sort and group elements 
we put similar sized events together in the same bin and 
then each bin is plotted with the average event size on 
the x-axis and the frequency that an event fell in that 
particular category on the y-axis. We choose a minimum 
number of events in a bin (n) to minimize statistical 
fluctuations in the counts, for most of the work shown 
here we use n=10.  Once all outages are sorted and 
grouped in bins where every bin has a bin value and a 
frequency, we plot bin value vs frequency on a log-log 
plot. This plot is the PDF. If the plotted outages appear 
linear on this plot of the PDF, the data over that region 
can be described by a power law. A power law in this 
case indicates that large events occur more frequently 
than one would expect if outages were happening 
randomly, which would be shown in a plot by an 
exponential drop off. In this case, larger events can have 
a greater impact on the outages than the more frequent 
smaller events. Power laws can have varying slopes, and 
the slope of this power law region is also important. A 
shallower, less negative slope indicates that the larger 
events occur more frequently relative to the small event 
than with a steeper, more negative slope. 
Looking at the PDF below in Figure 3 for all of the 
outages in terms of duration in minutes times customers 
unserved, for a certain range of data points, there is a 
power law. It occurs for events in the size range 25-
26,000 (in meters times duration). 
 
 
Figure 3: PDF of Outages Measured by 
Customers  × Duration in Minutes 
 
We also look at the PDFs using the other two measures 
of size – duration in minutes and number of customers 
affected by the outage. Looking at these two PDFs as 
well can give us information like the relative importance 
that long or short outages have. The duration plot is 
shown below in Figure 4 with the number of customer 
unserved giving similar results. 
 
Figure 4: PDFs of Outages Measured by 
Duration in Minutes 
 
Because there is a power law in both plots, we can see 
that larger events again play a bigger role in the outages 
than one would expect from random sizes.  
   Looking at the PDF of the outages in terms of the 
energy unserved (Figure 5), there is also a power law. 
This power law has a nearly identical slope as the plot 
shown in Figure 8 using the measure of duration in 
minutes times customers unserved. From this we can see 




Figure 5: PDF of Outages Measured by 
Energy Unserved 
 
Because of the large difference in load demand in the 
summer versus the winter (see load demand subsection 
below), it is useful to analyze outages in terms of these 
seasons. Separating outages into summer vs winter and 
estimating energy not served in the same manner as 
before, we calculated the PDFs for both summer (June 
15 – Sept 15) and winter (the rest of the year). The slope 




This means there is a greater number of larger outages 
in the summer when the load demand is higher. 
We find power laws in our data in every different 
measure we use to quantify the sizes of our outages. This 
suggests this grid could be behaving like a complex 
system.  
   Because we see a characteristic of complex systems in 
our PDF analysis, we now want to see if there is a long-
time correlation in the system’s outage events. We use 
Mandelbrot’s R/S (range/standard deviation) analysis to 
determine the scales of any long-time correlation of the 
outages [17]. The time correlations in complex systems 
between certain sized events can be measured using the 
resulting Hurst exponent [17], [19]-[20]. The slope of 
this plot is called the Hurst exponent. A Hurst exponent 
larger than 0.5 means there is a positive correlation, 
meaning a blackout at one time may have an effect on a 
blackout that occurs on a later day. In contrast, a Hurst 
exponent below 0.5 means a negative correlation, and a 
Hurst exponent equal to 0.5 shows no correlation. 
 
Figure 6: R/S Analysis of Outages Measured 
by Duration in Minutes × Customers unserved 
(time lag in days) 
 
In Figure 6, we see a Hurst exponent of about 0.78 in 
the R/S plot, which indicates a long time correlation. 
This medium time correlation tells us that events 
happening today are affected by events that happened in 
the past, and similarly, events today will affect future 
events. From the plot we see that this correlation lasts 
between about 10 days to 3 years and perhaps longer but 
because of the way the R/S analysis is done, that is 
where the data points start to lose their statistical 
significance.  Extending this region would require a 
longer time series. 
The power laws from the above section and the longer 
time correlation found here suggest that the microgrid 
behaves like a complex system.  Because of this, we dig 
deeper into possible underlying causes for our outages 
in the form of looking at the cause codes associated with 





The outage data assigns each outage a three-digit 
cause code in which the first digit gives information on 
the broad category of the cause, and the next two digits 
give more detailed information in the form of 
subcategories. We will give some brief highlights here; 
a more detailed analysis of the causes will be given 
elsewhere. As one would expect, there are some outages 
that are much more common than others. This difference 
in outages for each cause is taken into account when 
choosing the bin size of the PDFs. For instance, if a 
cause has fewer than ten events, a bin size of two or 
three will be chosen rather than the usual bin size of ten 
events per bin. Another thing to be aware of is fewer 
than ten events is a very small sample size, and it can be 
hard to get a reliable trend from that amount of data.  
The top causes of outages are “Power Supplier – 
Diesel” 148 outages, “Distribution – Primary Cable” 
105 outages, “Planned Outage – Repairs” 91 outages, 
“Power Supplier – Hydro” 82 outages, and “Planned 
Outage – Replacement” 68 outages.  Because these 5 
types of outages make up 72% of all outages, we will 
focus on those causes to see if any of the trends deviate 
a significant amount from the total trend. This will also 
help show us if there is a certain cause that relates to 
more of the smaller or larger events than usual. 
The plots below, figure 7, are PDFs of the top two 
unplanned outage causes compared with the total 
outages. The plots include the slopes of both in ranges 
where they appeared similar. The same comparisons 
were done for the remaining top five outage causes for 
the power law regions. Of the top five causes of outages, 
the only one whose slope deviates significantly from the 
trend of the total outages is cause 302 – Planned Outage: 
Replacement. This cause forms a shallower slope of the 
power law in this PDF, so it accounts for a higher than 
average percentage of the outages that occur in the 
duration range of 150-400 minutes. Both cause 302, a 
planned outage and cause 301 - Planned Outage: 
Repairs, another planned outage cause have the largest 
power law slope deviation. Because of this, we next plot 
the unplanned and the planned outage PDF, figure 8. 
From this plot it is noticeable that in the middle range 
(5-300 minutes) the planned outages have a shallower 
slope. In this range it is the planned outages that account 
for a higher percentage of longer outages. However 
since the unplanned outages PDF extends further out it 
is these outages that account for all outages that last 






Figure 7: PDFs of Outages Associated with 
Cause Codes a.) 101 (Diesel Generator) and b.) 
203 (Primary cable) 
 
 
Figure 8: PDF of Planned vs Unplanned 
Outages 
A very important piece of historical data for this 
system is the fact that all power lines were buried in 
2011. We looked at different outage cause time series 
with this in mind. As one might expect, this didn’t have 
a noticeable effect on the outage causes as a whole 
except for the weather-related causes. There is a cause 
code category titled “Storm.”  In the time series of 
outages there are no outages due to these cause codes 
after the year 2011.  Even though we now know that 
burying the lines protects the system from outages 
directly due to storms, we still look at correlations of the 
outages with weather next to look for indirect 
correlations with storms or severe weather that relates to 
outages. For example, extreme high or low temperatures 
may change normal demands, or large amounts of snow 
may make access to components difficult for repairs. 
These things would not be labelled as storm-related 
even though weather or storms will still have an effect. 
 
Weather and Seasonal Correlations 
The weather factors we looked at include high winds, 
floods, blizzards, daily precipitation, daily snowfall, and 
daily temperatures. For each of these factors we looked 
at the time series of the outages along with the weather 
category or categories that we are analyzing. Each case 
was analyzed for coincidence between the outages using 
duration of events in minutes times the number of 
customers unserved and the weather event. The analysis 
was done from Jan 1, 2003-Dec 31, 2016. Since there 
are many events and there is no way to know the precise 
cause of each, we look at statistics in each of the time 
series. Using probabilities we compare the chances of 
having an outage during certain weather events to the 
probability of randomly having an outage on any given 
day. There are 682 outage events in 5,114 days; this 
means that on any given day there is about a 13% chance 
of having an outage event.  Wind (particularly after the 
line burial), and snowfall (including blizzards) show no 
significant correlations with the outages.  Precipitation 
(particularly large events) and temperature show at most 
a weak correlation with outages.  However, floods do 
seem to have a correlation.  Of the 4 floods, 3 of them 
coincide with an outage event, one being a very large 
outage event which also coincides with a large 
precipitation event. Even though the sample size is 
small, we think this may indicate that floods are likely 
to have an effect on outages. The result of the floods is 
an interesting one, because this seems to be the only 
storm-related event that may still affect the grid even 
though the lines are buried. 
 
Correlation of Outages with Load Demand 
The most significant metric we have used is 
comparing the outages with the load demand. We have 
the hourly load usage data (in MW) for the years 2005-
2017 and the outage data for the years 2003-2017 for the 
5 main feeders: Auxiliary, New Town, Main Town, 
Lake Avenue, and 13 Mile. We analyzed this data as 
with the weather data by plotting a time series of the 




the two and were able to both estimate an average trend 
in the load data as well as zoom in on each outage to 
determine whether the outage happened during a peak 
demand time or not. 
When plotting each feeder’s load demand 
individually, we observe that there are noticeable cycles 
in the load demand that differ. It is also found in these 
plots that there was a major reconfiguration of the lines 
in 2013 that caused some of the cycles to change. The 
most immediately noticeable cycle is that the Auxiliary 
feeder has a large peak demand in the summer, and this 
is likely due to the fact that this feeder goes to the fish 
processing locations. This cycle is also very noticeable 
in the Main Town feeder after the line reconfiguration 
in 2013. When zooming into the plots closer, the 13 
Mile, Lake Avenue, Main Town, and New Town feeders 
all have a daily cycle that peaks during the day, highest 
in the morning near 8am-noon and evening near 5-8pm 
and is at a low during the night near 10pm-6am. All 
feeders have slight peaks during the summer, but not as 
much as the Auxiliary and Main Town feeders. 
Figure 9, shows the time series for the loads (in MW) 
on all feeders combined for 2014. Below the average 
yearly cycle (top) is an average daily cycle (bottom). 
The amplitude of the daily cycles are more than a factor 
of 6 smaller than the annual cycle. 
 
 
Figure 9: a.) Annual and b.) Average Daily 
Load Demand Cycles 
When counting the outages that occurred during the 
day, we assumed the daytime peak was from 8am-10pm. 
When counting the outages during the summer time 
peak load demand we assumed that fell between mid-
June until mid-September. We used these times and 
dates to analyze the outages, specifically the percentage 
of outages that took place during a daily peak, a nightly 
lull, and a summertime peak compared with the 
percentage of outages that would happen in those times 
if outages were happening randomly. Along with total 
outages we also looked at the amount of different sized 
outages (small, medium, large) during each period in 
terms of “number of customers effected,” “duration of 
outages in minutes,” and “duration * number of 
customers affected.” 
From the “customers affected * duration in minutes” 
plot, we chose values to be cutoff values for the ranges 
of small, medium, and large outages. They are defined 
as: 
● Small: less than 5,000 
● Medium: between 5,000 and 15,000 
● Large: greater than 15,000 
The number of small, medium, large, and total outages 










Percentage 66.8% 33.9% 39.3% 61.3% 
Random 
Percentage 58.3% 41.7% 25.0% 75.0% 
 
Table 1: Summary of Probabilities of Outages 
During Different Points in Load Demand Cycle 
Measured by Customers unserved * Duration in 
Minutes 
In this table, when looking at total outages, we can see 
a clearly higher percentage of outages that happen 
during the summer than we would expect if outages 
were just happening randomly. There is also a slightly 
higher number of outages that occur in the daytime than 
we would expect from them being randomly timed, but 
the percentage is not much higher so this could be 
statistically insignificant; the low number of events 
makes it impossible to determine. Because the yearly 
variations in load demand are much larger, this suggests 
a correlation with more outages during higher load 
demand times which is expected. 
This same process is repeated twice more (tables 2 
and 3) except this time we are measuring the outages in 
terms of duration in minutes and then energy unserved. 
Here we chose the following values to represent small, 




● Small: Less than 30 minutes 
● Medium: Between 30 minutes and 120 minutes 
● Large: Greater than 120 minutes (2 hours) 
We chose these values based on the outages in the plot 
along with our own opinions on what we would consider 








Percentage 65.4% 34.6% 40.8% 
Random 
Percentage 58.3% 41.7% 25.0% 
Table 2: Summary of Probabilities of Outages 
During Different Points in Load Demand Cycle 
Measured by Duration in Minutes 
For energy unserved we chose the following values 
for small, medium, and large outages based on the 
distribution of sizes in the time series. 
● Small: less than 5 MW*min. 
● Medium: 5-30 MW*min. 










Percentage 65.1% 34.9% 36.4% 64.1% 
Random 
Percentage 62.5% 37.5% 25.0% 75.0% 
Table 3: Summary of Probabilities of Outages 
During Different Points in Load Demand Cycle 
Measured by Energy Unserved 
One interesting thing that is seen here when loads are 
split up by size is that there are fewer large outages 
during the day and more during the night. Since the 
planned outages are filtered out already, this could 
possibly be due to a faster response time and/or more 
people working on the issue during the day. There is also 
a very large percentage of small outages that happen 
during the daytime peak in load demand. When 
comparing the tables using the two different 
measurements of outage, we can see that the outages 
that happen during the nighttime lull tend to be much 
longer in duration. 
Since the summer peak here is defined by mid-June to 
mid-September, the probability of randomly having 
outages that fall in this time frame would be 3/12 or 
25%. The actual percentage of outages that fall in this 
range is just over 40%. Since we have 13 years of data 
this is enough to say that there are significantly more 
outages in the summer time. There are some years, such 
as 2016, which we know to be a low fish processing year 
(i.e. lower summertime demand) that can be seen to 
have a lower percentage of outages in the summer. This 
helps reinforce our presumed relationship that the higher 
demand in the summer, even if it is only on one or two 
feeders, leads to more outages overall during this time. 
For most days the daytime peak in the daily cycle falls 
within the 7am-10pm time range. The probability of an 
outage randomly falling in this time frame would be 
15/24 or 62.5%. The actual percentage of outages that 
fall during this time frame is 65%. While this is slightly 
higher than random, it is not a lot higher. Since there are 
13 years of data, the slight increase may be statistically 
meaningful, but is not as significant as the summertime 
peak in load demand. 
Between the large increase in the number of outages 
in the summer and the slightly increased number of 
outages in the day time, plus a mechanism based on the 
increased stress on the system, we conclude that higher 
demand leads to a higher chance of an outage. With this 
knowledge we look into the difference in outage size 
distribution at different times during the annual and 
daily cycles using slopes from PDFs. A summary of the 
results from the PDFs in terms of energy unserved are 
shown in table 4 below. 






Before Lines Buried -0.892 
After Lines Buried -0.888 
Table 4: Summary of Slopes of PDFs of 
Outages Measured by Energy Unserved During 
Different Points in Load Demand Cycle 
These results are consistent with what was found in 
tables 1-3 above. There are more large outages 
occurring at night and during the summer. Because the 
change in load demand in summer vs winter is much 
larger than the difference between day vs night, we take 
the summer vs winter result to be more significant in 
terms of the effect of load demand on outages. 
 
4. Risk  
 
The reason for doing much of the above analysis on 
the system is to get a better idea behind what threatens 
the system in terms of outages, especially large outages, 
on the power grid. By becoming more aware of the 
factors surrounding a higher or lower than average 
amount of outages occurring, one can have a better idea 
of where and how to make the grid more resilient. To 
quantify this, we have come up with a risk metric that 




compared to a different time period with different 
characteristics. 
First we compare the risk in the summer when there 
is a peak in the power demand vs the risk in the winter 
when there is no peak in the power demand (See figure 
9, the top plot of average yearly cycle at the beginning 
of the previous subsection). Risk is calculated using 
probability of a given event happening, P, and the 
estimated cost of that event [18]. The estimated cost is 
the approximated energy unserved in the outage. These 
points are plotted on a log-log plot and then a single risk 
value, R, is found by integrating this plot and taking this 
value times the frequency of an event occurring. The 
value for R gives a single numerical metric of risk meant 
to allow a simple comparison to understand the 
difference in risk between two different periods in time. 
A higher value for R represents a larger risk for the time 
period in question. Following [18], the equations to 
obtain R are as follows: 
 
Where the “width of the bin” is the cost described above. 
Comparing winter and summer, the results for the risk 
index were what we expected; the summer had a much 
larger value for risk index than winter as shown in table 
5 below. 
 
Table 5: Risk Index Values for Summer vs 
Winter 
We then calculated and plotted risk for before and 
after all lines were buried (this occurred in 2011) to 
determine whether or not this had an effect on the risk 
of an outage occurring. We see in table 6 below that the 
lines being buried results in a much lower risk. 
 
Table 6: Risk Index Values for Before vs After 
all the Lines were Buried Underground 
We then combined the above two comparisons and 
looked at risk in the summer vs winter for both before 
and after the lines were buried. These risk values are 
listed in table 7 below. 
 
Table 7: Risk Index Values for Combined 
Summer vs Winter and Before vs After Line 
Burial 
Our results were consistent with above, risk was highest 
in the summer before the lines were buried and lowest 
in the winter after the lines were buried. From this we 
see that the system did indeed benefit from burying the 
lines and also that the system is less at risk of an outage 
when the load demand is lower. Calculating the risk 
metric from various causes and on individual feeders is 
a goal but for most causes the data is too sparse.  The 
risk metric on the individual feeder will be presented in 
another publication.   
5. Conclusions  
 
In this preliminary overview, the power law 
behavior of outage size and the time correlations over 
several years in the Cordova microgrid are reminiscent 
of similar behaviors at longer space and time scales in 
bulk power transmission system blackouts. These 
patterns in series of transmission system blackouts can 
be explained by complex system dynamics acting over 
time so that the engineering responses to blackouts 
shape the blackout risk, yielding  the power laws and 
time correlations. Therefore, the similar results we 
observe in the Cordova microgrid open the door to 
possible complex system explanations of the Cordova 
results. However, some caution is needed since the 
microgrid system has some different characteristics 
from a transmission system.  
In contrast to the meshed transmission system, the 
microgrid is a mostly radial network, and the outages 
show only a small amount of cascading. Indeed, 
distribution outages in the microgrid disconnect the 
downstream feeder(s) only. The position of the breakers, 
switches, and fuses in the system determine the 
customers disconnected in both the scheduled and 
forced distribution outages. The engineering that shapes 
the design of the distribution system incorporates both 
prior general knowledge that is accumulated over years 
as well as responses to the particular features and 
operational experience and previous outages of the 
microgrid. Moreover, while transmission systems in 
developed countries are generally designed with many 
possible generator sources with a substantial surplus of 




synchronous sources of power and is more vulnerable to 
outage of these sources or their connection to the 
microgrid. Therefore we expect that the form of any 
complex dynamics or other forces that drive the form of 
the microgrid reliability could differ from the complex 
dynamics of series transmission system blackouts. 
Details of this comparison will be explored in a future 
longer publication. 
This system has a higher energy demand in the 
summer than the winter, which is due to the fish 
processing that occurs during these months. Due to the 
high energy demand in the summer we find a higher risk 
in the system in the summer compared to the winter 
months when load demand is lower. We also find that 
the overall risk dropped significantly after the year 
2011, when all of the power lines were buried 
underground; this burial of the cables also resulted in a 
near elimination of weather-related outages (there were 
still some flood related outages). This analysis points to 
the need for non-normal risk analysis even for micro-
grids and presents tools both for approaching risk 
analysis and for investigation of where investments 
might have the highest impact on reducing risk and 
improving reliability.  Finally, these same tools are 
being applied to model other results for the Cordova 
grid, which when validated against these results allow 
for “what if” scenario exploration again for how to 
improve the reliability and reduce risk. 
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